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SPENCER v. MURRAY
(SPENCER H)
18 F. 3d 229 (4th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On the night of October 2, 1987, or in the early morning of October
3, 1987, Timothy Wilson Spencer cut out a large portion of screen from
a second-story bedroom window and entered the home of Dr. Susan
Hellams. Upon finding Dr. Hellams, Spencer fractured her nose, used
blunt force on her lower lip, kicked her in the back of the leg, and caused
various bruises and scrapes. Spencer then raped Hellams and strangled
her to death with a ligature device. A medical examiner found fluid con-
sistent with seminal fluid on her back and in the gluteal fold.
Spermatozoa was present on swabs taken from Hellams' vagina, rectum
and perianal area. Spermatozoa and seminal fluid were also discovered on
her slip and skirt. The stains on the slip and skirt, as well as the swab
taken form the perianal area were examined by an expert serologist for
the Commonwealth. When these samples were compared to samples of
Spencer's blood, the seminal fluid secretions were found to be consistent
with Spencer's secretion type, while inconsistent with Hellams' hus-
band's type. Further, the secretions in the seminal fluid found in the peri-
anal area were inconsistent with a combination of the blood types of Dr.
Hellams and her husband, while consistent with the combination of Dr.
Hellams' and Spencer's blood. DNA analysis done on Spencer's blood
and a sample of the seminal fluid on Dr. Hellams' slip resulted in a match.
The DNA evidence was presented at trial, and the jury convicted
Spencer of capital murder, rape, sodomy and burglary. Spencer was sen-
tenced to death. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the death sen-
tence on direct appeal. 1 Spencer continued unsuccessfully to seek relief
through appeals and collateral proceedings. Following denial of relief in
the federal district court, this case reached the Fourth Circuit.
2
Spencer based his appeal to the Fourth Circuit on seven grounds: (1)
his trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to secure a DNA
expert for the defense; (2) he is "actually innocent" of the crime for which
he received a capital sentence, and he would not have been convicted if
he had (a) been able to challenge the DNA evidence and (b) if there had
not been a "prejudicial injection of astronomical probability ratios" into
the trial; (3) his trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to con-
duct voir dire on the issue of racial prejudice; (4) Virginia's proportion-
ality review is unconstitutional, as is the application of Virginia's default
rules because there are no "rational exceptions"; (5) the jury instructions
on mitigating evidence were constitutionally inadequate; (6) his trial
counsel were ineffective because they failed to explore or present certain
mitigating evidence; (7) (a) the DNA analysis used in this particular case
was subject to error and thus produced unreliable results, (b) the DNA
analysis results should not have been admitted, and (c) his trial counsel
were ineffective in the manner they handled the DNA evidence.
I Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989).
2 Spencer v. Murray, No. 3:92CV160 (E.D. Va. Jan. 21, 1993).
3 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974).
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
several of Spencer's claims were procedurally defaulted, and thus pre-
cluded from federal habeas review. The court relied on the rule set forth
in Slayton v. Parrigan.3 Slayton held that federal review of a claim is
barred when a habeas petitioner has defaulted that claim in a state court
on the basis of an independent and adequate state procedural rule.
Spencer's claims that the proportionality review and the default rules are
unconstitutional were also defaulted, as were his claims concerning the
jury instructions regarding mitigation evidence, and most of Spencer's
DNA analysis claims.
The court considered and rejected Spencer's claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. First, the court held that defense counsel had acted
acceptably in trying to obtain a defense expert. Defense counsel ques-
tioned at least four experts and tried to find one willing to testify at trial,
but none of the experts were willing to do so. The court held that as coun-
sel made an affirmative attempt to obtain an expert, they should not be
deemed ineffective merely because they could not find one who would
testify.
Second, the court held that defense counsel's decision not to ques-
tion the venire on issues of race was based on a sound trial strategy deci-
sion and thus did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. The fact
that counsel had previously obtained a change of venire, in which the
members were selected from Norfolk rather than Richmond, was suffi-
cient for defense counsel to conclude that race was not an issue in the
case.
Third, the court rejected Spencer's claim that defense counsel were
ineffective regarding the collection and presentation of mitigation evi-
dence. The court ruled that defense counsel had conducted a thorough
investigation of Spencer and his background, both on their own and with
the aid of a private investigator. Defense counsel talked with Spencer's
family and friends, and also observed defense mitigation witnesses in
Spencer's other trials for similar murders in Arlington and Richmond.
Further, the court held that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for
the defense counsel to fail to call a psychologist to the witness stand.
Again, the court ruled that the decision amounted to trial strategy.
As an excuse for default on his claim regarding the reliability of
DNA evidence in this particular case, Spencer raised an "actual inno-
cence" claim. Spencer claimed that he would not have been convicted if
there had not been a "prejudicial injection of astronomical probability
ratios" into the trial. The Court held, however, that Spencer's claim was
procedurally defaulted because it was not presented to the Supreme Court
of Virginia on direct appeal. Further, the court held that Spencer failed to
meet the threshold requirement of the "innocent of the death penalty"
exception of Sawyer v. Whitley.4 Under the Sawyer test, a. defendant's
4 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). See case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992). See also case summary of
Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
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claim of "innocence of the death penalty" will not be considered unless
the defendant first shows "by clear and convincing evidence that but for
a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petition-
er eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law.
' 5
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Of the issues that the Fourth Circuit considered on the merits, those
concerning ineffective assistance of counsel and "actual innocence" may
be the most interesting and of the most help to Virginia defense counsel.
The ineffective assistance of counsel claims will be considered separate-
ly on the narrower issues of: (a) procurement of a defense expert; (b) con-
ducting voir dire to determine if there is any race bias by venire members;
and (c) mitigation investigation. Spencer's "actual innocence" claim will
be discussed as a whole.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." In Strickland v.
Washington,6 the United States Supreme Court established a deferential
standard for attorneys, which created a very high threshold for convicted
defendants to meet before they may succeed on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. According to Strickland, the representation must be so
defective as to constitute a denial of fundamental fairness. The two-prong
test that defendants must meet is as follows:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's perfor-
mance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or
death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.
7
Strickland further states that when a petitioner is challenging a death
sentence, "the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that,
absent the errors, the sentencer-including an appellate court, to the
extent it independently reweighs the evidence-would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not war-
rant death." 8
5 Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2517.
6 466 U.S. 668 (1984). For more information on Strickland and on
ineffective assistance of counsel in general, see Marlowe, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel or "How I Can Satisfy the Sixth Amendment and
Still Not Help My Client," Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 29
(1990).
7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
8 Id. at 695.
9 Spencer v. Murray, 18 F. 3d 229,233 (4th Cir. 1994); see also case
summary of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
t0 Spencer 11, 18 F. 3d at 233.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 The independent analysis only verified the Commonwealth's
results. Id. See case summary of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
A. Procurement of a Defense Expert
Spencer had two trials in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond
(Spencer I and Spencer I1), both of which were tried before the same
judge and defended by the same counsel. As the two trials were only four
months apart, the state trial judge allowed defense counsel to file consol-
idated motions for the cases. Defense counsel filed a motion with the trial
court to notify the judge that they might later seek funds for an expert.9
Spencer's claim of error is that the defense counsel did not follow
through with their motion. Spencer claims that,
[n]othing in the record reveals that counsel did anything to
follow through with this motion. No mention is made any-
where in the record of any additional requests for hearings or
experts.
As counsel recognized the need for specific experts,
some affirmative steps should have been taken to secure
them .... If nothing else, counsel should have read the cur-
rent literature dealing with forensic DNA. 10
The Fourth Circuit concluded that defense counsel did follow
through in trying to procure an expert.11 Defense counsel submitted an
affidavit with the trial court, outlining their DNA research. Further,
defense counsel talked with at least four DNA experts in an attempt to
locate one who would be willing to testify on behalf of Spencer. Yet
defense counsel explained that they "were unable to find an expert who
was willing to accept such an appointment." 12 Further, as a means of ver-
ifying the reliability of the DNA evidence, the attorneys had a blind
analysis of Spencer's blood performed by an independent laboratory,
13
and attended Spencer's third capital murder trial for a third defendant,
which was held in Arlington.
14
The Fourth Circuit held that these actions were enough to overcome
a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as Spencer
failed to meet his burden of proof as to the deficiency of defense coun-
sel's work.15 Failure to procure a DNA expert may not violate the
Strickland test, but every effort should be made to secure independent
evaluation of important prosecution evidence, even if the evaluation does
not ultimately prove helpful.
First, under Ake v. Oklahoma,16 an indigent defendant is entitled to
court appointment of an expert on issues of sufficient importance. Ake
requires neither that defense counsel reveal the expert's opinions to the
Commonwealth, nor call the expert to testify at trial. Second, it may help
defense counsel to know that there are several organizations that are
available to aid defense counsel in finding expert witnesses for trial.
17
14 In addition to the capital murders in Spencer I and Spencer 11,
Spencer was tried and convicted of the capital murder of Susan Tucker in
Arlington County. An appeal concerning the Arlington trial is pending on
the Fourth Circuit's docket as Case Number 93-4004. Spencer 11, 18 F.
3d at 234 n. 5.
15 Spencer 11, 18 F. 3d at 234.
16 470 U.S. 68 (1985). For more information on using Ake to obtain
a defense expert, see case summary of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
17 For help in obtaining an expert, defense counsel may want to con-
tact one or more of the following: Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse;
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Suite 301, 1275 K
Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005, (tel.) (202) 682-1300, (fax) (202)
682-1312; Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center, 1001 East
Main Street, P.O. Box 506, Richmond, Virginia, 23219 (tel.) (804) 643-
6845 or 1-800-697-6841.
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B. Race Bias Voir Dire
Spencer claimed that his counsel were ineffective because they did
not conduct voir dire on the issue of racial bias. 18 Pre-trial, counsel
obtained a change of venire from Richmond because of the publicity sur-
rounding Spencer's first Richmond trial. Thus, jury selection took place
in Norfolk. Defense counsel alleged at habeas that during individual voir
dire, if a venire member gave counsel any reason to doubt the member's
impartiality, they would continue to ask questions until the person satis-
fied them that they could be impartial or until the counsel had enough
suspicion to strike the venire member for cause. The counsel explained
their reasoning for not explicitly conducting rase bias voir dire:
In our view, particularly because of the change of venire, race
was simply not an issue in the case. We had no reason to
believe that any prospective juror harbored any racial bias
against Spencer, and our decision not to ask any questions on
voir dire that might have injected race into the case was a mat-
ter of trial tactics.
19
Relying on Strickland,20 the Fourth Circuit deferred "to counsel's sound
trial strategy decisions.
' 2 1
Both Strickland and Burger v. Kemp22 held that tactical decisions
based on sufficient evidence are not to be second-guessed:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-
guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sen-
tence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable ....
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged con-
duct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective
at the time.
23
The Fourth Circuit is likewise very deferential to defense attorneys,
as evidenced by the decision rendered in Clozza v. Murray.2 4 In that case,
defense counsel made statements at trial that he "did not want to put peti-
tioner 'back on the street' and that if Clozza's attempt at suicide had been
successful, 'it would not have been the greatest tragedy. '25 The Fourth
Circuit accepted defense counsel's statement that his comments were part
of his trial strategy to build credibility with the jury.26 The court held:
The remarks which Clozza contends shows hopelessness and
disgust indicated to the jury that defense counsel understood
the gravity of the crimes as well as their horrible nature. Had
counsel attempted to pass the crimes off as anything other
than the atrocities that they were, his credibility with the jury
would most certainly become [sic] suspect. Thus we con-
clude, that counsel's remarks were consistent with his trial
strategy.
27
18 Spencer I, 18 F. 3d at 234.
19 Id.
20 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
21 Spencer I, 18 F. 3d at 234.
22 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
23 Burger, 483 U.S. at 789 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
24 913 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1990). See case summary of Clozza,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 9 (1991).
Despite this deference, counsel should know that race is a factor in
cases when the defendant and the victim are not of the same race. In
Spencer II, Spencer was black and his victim was white. Statistics report-
ed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., indicate
that out of the total of twenty-one executions in Virginia under its mod-
ern statute, more than one-third have been black defendants whose vic-
tims were white. Virginia has yet to execute a white person for the mur-
der of a black person.28 Counsel should be armed with this knowledge
when conducting voir dire, to ferret out any potential racial bias on the
part of the venire members.
C. Mitigation Investigation
In his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding mitigation
evidence, Spencer first claimed that his counsel failed to conduct a thor-
ough investigation, and that if they had, they would have discovered
information about Spencer's troubled childhood, about his use of the drug
PCP, and about the possibility that Spencer suffered from organic brain
damage.2 9 The Fourth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to
show that defense counsel conducted an investigation, both alone and
with the help of a private investigator. Further, defense counsel had
observed the mitigation witnesses at both of Spencer's other trials in
Arlington and Richmond.
30
The Fourth Circuit followed the general trend of courts rarely to find
that the extent of an investigation by counsel is insufficient. In Strickland,
the court held: "In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all of the cir-
cumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judg-
ments.,
3 1
Spencer next claimed that defense counsel should have obtained a
psychiatrist to testify as to Spencer's mental state. Defense counsel
responded by explaining that they personally never had any reason to
doubt Spencer's sanity. Counsel knew that counsel in the Arlington trial
had hired a psychiatrist and a psychologist, neither of whom found any
mitigating circumstances. At the suggestion of Richmond's criminal
defense bar, defense counsel asked Dr. Mullaney to evaluate Spencer
before his first Richmond trial. The psychiatrist concluded that Spencer's
imprisonment would minimize his future dangerousness. However, if
called to testify at the penalty stage, the psychiatrist would have to admit
that Spencer still denied his guilt and showed absolutely no remorse.
Defense counsel alleged at habeas that they had made a tactical decision
not to call Dr. Mullaney as a witness because:
We knew that if we wanted to use Dr. Mullaney, then pur-
suant to Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1F, the prosecution
would be entitled to have Spencer evaluated by its own
expert. Based upon what we knew about Spencer and his
offenses, we had no doubt that the state's expert would render
an opinion that Spencer was, in fact, "future dangerous."
32
For ineffective assistance of counsel purposes, defense counsel
acted adequately. However, there is a case in mitigation for everyone,
developed through a thorough investigation and the procurement of
25 Clozza, 913 F. 2d at 1098.
26 Id. at 1100.
27 Id. at 1099.
28 NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row,
U.SA, p. 4 (Fall 1993).
29 Spencer II, 18 F. 3d at 234.
30 Id.
31 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added).
32 Spencer 11, 18 F. 3d at 235.
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experts. Under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1F, defense counsel has
no duty to surrender the defendant for a reciprocal examination by the
Commonwealth unless the defense decides to call the expert as a wit-
ness.33 Therefore, defense counsel may want to get informal assistance in
developing a theory of mitigation. Such informal assistance avoids the





On the issue of actual innocence, Spencer was alleging "innocence"
as an excuse for default. The Fourth Circuit held that the applicable test
was the "no reasonable juror" test of Sawyer v. Whitley,36 which requires
that but for the alleged error, no reasonable juror would have found the
defendant eligible for the death penalty. Although the Sawyer test is a
very stringent test, it is somewhat easier to meet than the Herrera "newly-
discovered evidence" test.
37
33 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F) states, in relevant part:
If the attorney for the defendant gives notice pursuant to sub-
section E and the Commonwealth thereafter seeks an evalua-
tion concerning the existence or absence of mitigating cir-
cumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition at the
time of the offense, the court shall appoint one or more qual-
ified experts to perform such an evaluation.
(emphasis added)
34 See case summary of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
Although the Fourth Circuit found Sawyer to be the "excuse for
default" standard, it found that the error complained of-the admission
of the expert evidence-was a state evidentiary law matter. If, however,
the issue defaulted was a clearly federal issue, the Sawyer test should
provide a way to save the defaulted claim for consideration in federal
court. An example of when the Sawyer "excuse for default" standard
would help the defendant is in a situation where the only aggravating fac-
tor supporting the death sentence was "vileness" and the jury was not
given any limiting construction of that term, and where the circum-
stances of the crime were arguably not vile within a constitutionally
acceptable definition of that term. In such a situation, defense counsel
could argue that no reasonable juror using a proper definition of the term
would have found vileness. In such a case the Sawyer test should permit
a defaulted challenge to the application of the vileness factor to be deter-
mined on its merits since the error complained of plainly implicates fed-
eral constitutional law.
Summary and analysis by:
Mar Karen Simmons
35 For more information about the actual innocence tests set forth in
Herrera v. Collins and Sawyer v. Whitley, see case summary of Spencer
I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
36 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). See case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992). For an explanation of the "no
reasonable juror" requirement set forth in Sawyer, see also case summa-
ry of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
37 For an explanation of the "actual innocence" test set forth in
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), see case summary of Herrera,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 4 (1993). See also case summa-
ry of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
SWANN v. COMMONWEALTH
441 S.E. 2d 195 (Va. 1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On November 7, 1992, Calvin Swann, in need of money to buy
drugs, entered the Danville home of Conway Forrest Richter intending to
rob him. When Richter resisted, Swann shot him in the chest with a shot-
gun. Richter staggered to his front porch and collapsed. Swann then
removed Richter's wallet and fled with sixty dollars. After fleeing,
Swann disposed of most of his bloody clothing and sold his shotgun.
After an investigation, the police identified Swann, who was serving
time in the city jail on other charges, as a possible suspect. After securing
a Miranda waiver, the police interviewed Swann. After a number of
inconsistent statements by Swann and a series of suggestive representa-
tions and misrepresentations by the police, Swann confessed to the
killing, was tried, and convicted of capital murder.
At the penalty trial, defense counsel attempted to explain to the jury
1 Swann properly preserved a number of assignments of error which
the court reviewed in this case. They include: (1) failure to suppress
Swann's statements allegedly made involuntarily at the pretrial stage; (2)
failure to appoint an additional mental health expert to assist in evaluat-
ing Swann's reaction to anti-schizophrenic drugs, and to assist with the
case in mitigation; (3) the improper use of peremptory strikes to remove
that should Swann be sentenced to life in prison, it would be at least twen-
ty-one years before he could be released on parole. The Commonwealth
objected to counsel's attempt to inject information about parole law into
the proceeding. Foreclosed from discussing the reality of parole eligibil-
ity, defense counsel then attempted to assure the jury that sentencing
Swann to life in prison logically meant that he would remain in prison for
the rest of his life. The Commonwealth's attorney objected to this argu-
ment as well, and was permitted to deny before the jury that it correctly
characterized Swann's future after a life sentence. Relying on the statuto-
ry aggravating factor of "future dangerousness," the jury sentenced
Swann to death.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Swann made numer-
ous assignments of error concerning various aspects of the case.1 In addi-
two jurors from the panel on the basis of race; (4) the prejudicial admis-
sion of photographs and videotapes of the victim and the crime scene; (5)
the insufficiency of evidence of capital murder and robbery; (6) the
unconstitutionality of Virginia's capital statute and statutory verdict form.
The court rejected all of Swann's assertions, and the various arguments
will not be discussed in this summary.
